Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
He was the son of John Meredith Tompson, a draper, born 1858 in Hertfordshire and his wife Kate Mary Tompson (nee Joyce, married in the 2nd quarter of 1888 in the Leicester district), born 1868 in Leicester. Frank Meredith Tompson was born in the 3rd quarter of 1896 in Leicester, his siblings were, Dorothy Emily, born 1890, Miriam Kathleen, born 1891, Gordon Charles, born 1893 and Bertram Edward, born 1898, in March 1901 the family home was at Freemans Common, Leicester. In April 1911 Frank was a schoolboy and was residing in the family home at 58, Regents Road, Leicester, together with his father, a draper, his mother who was assisting in the family business, and his siblings, Dorothy, an elementary school teacher, Miriam, a draper’s assistant, Gordon, a county court clerk and Bertram, a schoolboy. The family later resided at The Parsonage, Braunstone, Leicester. Frank had been a student at Mirfield Theological College, (College of the Resurrection).
The War Diary records: 9 Apr-17 – TRENCHES EAST OF ROCLINCOURT. The Battalion attacked three lines of enemy’s trenches EAST of ROCLINCOURT at 5:30am and succeeded in capturing its objectives known as the “BLACK LINE.” (See Battle account attached)
Casualties. Officers killed, 2nd Lt. Stewart G., 2nd Lt. Law H. M., 2nd Lt. Webster C. A., 2nd Lt. Middleton E. R. B. Officers wounded, 2nd Lt. Jas. Low, 2nd Lt. G. C. A. Robertson, 2nd Lt. A. Macdonald, 2nd Lt. J. Spence. Other ranks killed, 142, wounded, 176, missing 2.
An account of the battle fought on 9th April, 1917, as taken part in by the 1/6th Battalion of the Seaforth Highlanders.

1. Date and hour of the attack.
The date and hour fixed, were 9th April, 1917, at 5:30 am.

2. Place of the attack.
The system of the German trenches east of ROCLINCOURT and the particular portion allocated to the Battalion was: –
(a) The first German line from A. 23. d. 20. 55. on the left to A. 29. b. 90. 95. on the right.
(B) The second German and support line from A. 23. d. 35. 65. on the left to A. 24. c. 06. 04. on the right.
(C) The third German line, known as the "BLACK LINE" from A. 23. b. 90. 00. on the left to A. 24. c. 37. 18. on the right.

3. Disposition of the attack.
Two platoons of “B” Coy on the left, “A” Coy in the centre and “C” Coy on the right in two double waves were responsible for the capture of the first two German lines, while one platoon of “B” Coy on the left and “D” on the right in one double wave were responsible for the capture of the third German line, known as the “BLACK LINE”. One platoon of “B” Coy in reserve in FISH TUNNEL. The 6th Bn.. GORDON HIGHLANDERS was on the Battalion’s right and the 9th Bn. ROYAL SCOTS (154th Infantry Brigade) on the left.

4.Dress and equipment.
While at BEAUMONT HAMEL the men wore overcoats with the flaps hooked back it was decided on this occasion to dispense with the overcoat. This was found to work most satisfactorily and the men did not suffer any hardship whatever. The wearing of the leather jerkin’s up to within a few hours of ZERO gave the men ample protection. The collection and storage of the jerkin’s was carried out without difficulty and no trouble was experienced in collecting them after the battle. The waves responsible for the German first and support lines did not carry picks, shovels or sand bags, and this too was found to be very sound. So much depends on the success of these waves that the lighter they are equipped the better, and the truth of this was abundantly proved. The number of bombs, Lewis gun drums and wire cutters, etc., carried was sufficient and the distribution of tools and some bags satisfactory.

5.System adopted for the attack.
The LEAP FROG system was adopted and the more one sees it in actual operation the more firmly one is convinced that it is the best possible method. The men responsible for each line went forward in a double wave, starting off at 80 yards distance between each single wave and 30 yards distance between each double wave but amalgamating into one wave immediately before the assault and attacking as one wave. The two double waves going to the first and second lines were accommodated in the old FRENCH TRENCH, while the double wave going to the third German line was put into the FIRST BRITISH trench and the saps leading to the old FRENCH TRENCH whenever the first two waves went forward. The pushing of these men forward in this way saved many casualties from the hostile barrage.

6. Assembly for the attack.
The Battalion moved from X Hutment’s into the trenches on “X/Y” night, taking over its battle sector from the 1/7th Bn. GORDON HIGHLANDERS. The dispositions were as follows: – Battalion Headquarters, A and C Coy. Remained in X Hutment’s. On the way to the trenches A and C Coy’s halted near ANZIN, where a hot meal was served out to the men. There also, all the bombs and rations to be carried by the men into battle were distributed. I think that these latter could quite conveniently have been served out in the trenches, yet it practically meant no extra load, and it assured the men being in possession of them. A and C Companies carried out the ordinary trench duties until “Y/Z” night, especially patrolling and preparation of trenches for the attack. On “Y/Z” night B and D Companies moved up from ANZIN and X Hutment’s respectively, to the trenches. B Company before starting having had a hot meal and been served out with bombs, rations, sandbags and tools, while D Company follow the procedure adopted by A and C Companies on the preceding night. This arrangement for both companies was found to work admirably and in fact it would have been a difficult matter to have had the distribution of bombs, rations, etc., served out in the trenches on the arrival of the men. At 12:30 am on “Z” day the Battalion moved into its assembly trenches. C Company who were holding the line moved along to the right of the sector leaving the sentry post manned, and protective patrols in the old FRENCH TRENCH. B Company was the first to arrive and the men filed into the line and took up its battle position in the old FRENCH TRENCH and BONNAL TRENCH. D Company then arrived and assembled in BONNAL TRENCH. A Company which had been accommodated in the tunnel at K. 36. Now moved out and went into its battle position in the old FRENCH TRENCH, which allowed C Company now to close to the left and find touch with A Company. When assembled the companies were formed up as follows: –
(a) The OLD FRENCH TRENCH. C Company on the right, A Company in the centre and B Company (two platoons) on the left.
(b) BONNAL TRENCH. D Company on the right, and B Company (one platoon) on the left.
By the above arrangement whereby only one company moved into its assembly position at a time, there was comparatively little movement and the strictest silence was observed. The Battalion was assembled for the attack at 3:30 am, and after hot meal with rum, which was greatly appreciated, was served out, the Battalion was ready to move forward to the attack. Watches had been synchronised so that everything was in readiness

7. The attack on the first German line.
Five minutes before ZERO hour (5:30 am) word was passed down the lines to fix bayonets and get ready. At 5:30 am exactly, the barrage commenced and without a moment’s hesitation the first line of the double wave leapt from the assembly trench. No difficulty was experienced in getting through our own wire as it had been carefully cut beforehand. The second line followed on and joined up with the first line under the barrage. The double waves advanced just as in practice. There can be no doubt that this was the result on the thorough and expert training experienced at the hands of the Brigadier general. The barrage was most accurate but the common remark of the men was that it was not so heavy as at BEAUMONT HAMEL and therefore lighter than they expected. Some men even expressed disappointment with the barrage. On the right and centre the first wave was able to get as close as 10 yards while on the left the men were within 15 to 20 yards. Not a single complaint has been heard of any of our shells bursting short. Immediately on the barrage lifting off the first German line at ZERO plus 4 minutes the first wave rushed forward and commenced shooting from the parapet without getting into the trench. This was found to be a most effective means of gaining the mastery over the enemy in occupation of the trench.
It has been found that the enemy was accustomed shooting from his dugout along the trench and thereby causing heavy casualties among our assaulting troops. By adopting this new system, the recommendation of the Brigadier General, our men had all the advantage and shot down into the trench and dugouts and they gained the complete upper hand of the enemy. It was very noticeable how effective this method was for the most of the enemy shot were found to be shot through the head. On the left and in the centre all the men got up to the trench without any opposition. Very few Germans were found in the trenches and therefore, on this front very few casualties were sustained by us. On the right however a different state of matters prevailed. Several of the enemy, and with remarkable alacrity, got out of the trench and into shell holes between the first and second lines from which they started to snipe at our advancing second wave, and the men of the first wave at work on the parapet and parados of the first trench. Several casualties were thus caused before the snipers were located and dealt with. A few men will, in future attacks, have to be detailed to deal with this menace. More of the enemy were found on the right but little difficulty was experienced in overcoming them and several prisoners were captured. A good many of the enemy were killed, especially on the right. One German officer, who killed two of our own men after putting his hands up, was quickly dispatched. Here a tunnel was found running from the first to the second German lines. The tunnel was splendidly built and was quite untouched by our heavy shelling. Touch on both flanks was soon gained and the dugouts thoroughly cleared. The work of reorganisation went on speedily. The wire in front of the first German line was well cut and at no point did it form an obstacle to the men. At one point on the right there was some bunched wire but the practice of doubling round and extending on the other side was well learnt and well carried out. No P. Bombs were used.

8. The capture of the second German line.
Immediately after the first double wave had moved forward the second double wave prepared to advance when the second ripple of the first wave had got away 50 yards the second double wave, in two distinct ripples jumped out of the trench, and got off. This double wave kept good distance and excellent direction. There was difficulty in keeping direction on the left that on account of careful rehearsing any likely trouble was avoided. This double wave, tried to cross the first German line but this was impossible owing to the damaged condition of the trench. The men had to get into the trench before getting over and thus some valuable seconds were lost. Only three minutes barrage was on the second line and this in the circumstances was found to be too short. The wave was excellently kept and although they had not sufficient time to amalgamate the first line of the double wave got rapidly up behind the barrage. All along the line we suffered a good many casualties from machine gun and rifle fire. On reaching the trench on the left little resistance was encountered and very soon touch was found with the 9th Bn. ROYAL SCOTS and splendid work was done in working up the communication trenches. In the centre very little opposition was encountered and the wave got in with very few casualties. On the right however the way was met with heavy machine gun and rifle fire. This fire came from a communication trench and from the open. With great skill and daring the parties told off to deal with these soon captured this machine gun and killed all the team. The snipers were also killed. The second line was completely in our hands and touch gained on both flanks by ZERO plus 20 minutes. Many Germans were killed in this line but very few taken prisoners. No P. Bombs were used in this line either. The wire here had also been excellently dealt with by the Artillery and formed no obstacle to our advance.

9. The capture of the third German line.
On the first two double waves advancing the third double wave moved up to the saps into the old FRENCH TRENCH and at a distance of 50 yards from the second double wave move forward in two single waves. Good progress was made on the left but on the right and enemy shell burst among our men shortly after leaving the ASSEMBLY TRENCH causing 15 casualties. On passing over the second line the left and centre platoons received a severe check and found it quite impossible to advance owing to the heavy machine-gun fire and sniping enfilading them from half right. This fire seemed to come from the direction of the “NEW BLACK LINE”. In the centre 2/Lt J. Spence with about 40 men kept in close touch with the barrage which however seemed to be very variable in length. Following up the SWITCH TRENCH this party got along with little resistance. Two dug-outs were bombed in the SWITCH TRENCH by a party detailed to deal with this trench. Two prisoners were also captured in the SWITCH TRENCH. The party pushed forward under 2/ Lt J. Spence and reach their objective the “BLACK LINE” at ZERO plus 34 minutes. On the right all the officers and been knocked out but led by N.C.O’s the men pressed forward dealing summarily with all snipers encountered until at 7:00am they obtained a firm footing in the third line. On the right party reaching their objective the enemy blew up a small mine behind the BLACK LINE but this had the result of causing several enemy casualties, and none to ourselves. Touch was obtained with the unit on our right by 7:30am but owing to enfilading machine-gun fire and considerable sniping from half right it was 9:00am before all the enemy in the centre were either killed or taken prisoners. On the extreme left owing to the machine-gun fire, one gun playing on the left and another from the extreme right in front of the third line, and sniping the men were forced to proceed very slowly. The casualties were very severe here. 2/Lt C. L. Read however collected some men of the 7th Bn.. Argyll and Sutherland Highlander’s whom we met and thus reinforced by a flanking movement succeeding in capturing one machine gun and killing all the team. This gave us possession of the left portion of the trench at 7:50am. Severe fighting took place in the “BLACK LINE” and before it was gained we suffered heavy casualties. These three parties immediately commenced to work towards each other and touch was found with each other and with the units on the flanks. Small parties were pushed forward along the
communication trenches towards the “NEW BLACK LINE”. Only one officer of the double wave responsible for capturing the “BLACK LINE” reached it. All the other officers were killed or wounded. Great credit is due to 2nd Lt C. L. Read and the NCOs of “B” and “D” Companies who fought so gallantly and finally reached their objective. About 7 o’clock the contact aeroplane passed overhead and sounded the klaxon horn. In response to this flares were lit on the left. No lights were seen to be fired from the contact aeroplane. Unless one was specially listening for the klaxon horn it would not be heard owing to the artillery fire and general confusion and din. The firing of a rocket from the aeroplane would be much more satisfactory. No P. Bombs were used in this trench. The wire was all cut and formed no obstacle.

10. Communications.
Until the “BLACK LINE” was captured all communications were done by runners. There seemed a tendency for runners to be sent off singly which I consider a great mistake. From all platoons messages came back promptly except in the case where a single runner was sent off and he became a casualty. I would suggest that two runners be always sent off and that each should carry a copy of the message. By this means if there is heavy shelling and the one carrying the message is knocked out the other need not wait and take the message from his comrade. Telephonic communication with the “BLACK LINE” was established at 11:00am.
11. Artillery and Stokes Mortars.
Their support was excellent and one cannot speak in too high terms of the work they did. The damaged condition of the trench speaks for what they did before the battle and the way in which the waves were able to follow up the barrage so closely is evidence of careful registering. The 9.45 Trench Mortar did splendid work on the SWITCH TRENCH and there was not an un-burst shell to be seen.
12. Grenades.
The No. 23 was found to be very effective on several occasions, especially where men were held up by machine gun fire. These enabled parties to get round on the flanks and get on the top of the team. Although the No. 20 or the No. 3 would give a longer range it is thought that the No. 23 fulfils all the purposes of an attack.
13. System of supply of water and rations.
This was excellent and could not be improved upon.
14. Casualties.
Our own casualties.
Officers killed 4. Wounded 5. Total 9.
Other ranks killed 142. Wounded 176. Missing 2. Total 320.
Most of the wounded were only slightly wounded.
15. Enemy casualties.
These were very heavy and especially at the junction of the second line and communication trenches and near machine-gun positions. Many were killed in trying to get back to the rear lines across the open when we turned Lewis guns and rifles on them as they try to get away.
16. Prisoners captured.
About 115.
17. Booty captured.
Two machine guns and five trench mortars, many letters documents etc.
18. Conditions of food in enemy trenches.
Plenty of loaf bread but practically no meat and very little butter.
19. General.
It might be suggested that five officers should be sent over with each Company. The fifth to be a Senior Officer who would receive messages as to difficult situations and be able to deal with them on the spot. When NCO’s are left in command of platoons as happened in one of our Company’s where every officer was killed or wounded it is difficult to secure proper centralisation or either cohesion. The provision of the fifth officer would obviate this. This officer would, in the case of a Company detailed to attack the first German lines have his Headquarters in the first British line, and in the case of a Company detailed to attack the second German line have his Headquarters in the first German line, and so on. I would suggest that officers and NCO’s should carry small periscopes in future attacks.
Signed A. McDonald Lt. Col. Commanding 1/6th Bn. Seaforth Highlanders. 14th April 1917.