Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
The War Diary records: 23-28 Apr-17 – COT trenches. Vide report attached.
ACCOUNT OF OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY THE 19TH BATTALION MANCHESTER REGIMENT BETWEEN APRIL 23RD AND 29TH, 1917.
On the morning of April 23rd, the battalion was in trenches in the HINDENBURG LINE on the west side of the Cojeul River in reserve to the 90th Brigade. At 9.15am the battalion received orders to move across the Cojeul River to the slope south east on HENINEL. By 11.30am the battalion was in position in the sunken road in N.28.d and N.34.b. At 12.40pm the battalion moved up to occupy left of the old British front line, its left resting on WANCOURT TOWER. D Company moved off first, followed by C, B, A Companies in this order. It was intended that they should arrive in the front-line trench in this order and that the left of D Company should rest on WANCOURT TOWER. On the way up to the trenches, however, the battalion came under artillery and machine gun fire and when the battalion arrived in the trench the Companies were considerably intermingled, A Company being on the left instead of the right. On the left of the battalion and in touch with them was the 150th Brigade.
At 5.00pm I was sent for to Brigade Headquarters and told that the attack would be renewed at 6.00pm. The objective was the original Blue Line overlooking CHERISY and the attack was to be made by the 19th Manchester Regiment on the right. It would have been difficult to carry out an easy operation at such short notice, and this was not an easy operation. In order to have a depth of three waves, it was necessary to attack on a frontage of three platoons. The objective was 800 yards of trench still held by an active enemy. At the time the order to attack arrived, the battalion was being reorganized into the original dispositions I had made, with D Company on the left and A Company on the right. As soon as I returned to my Headquarters, I assembled my Company Commanders and explained to them my plans for the attack. I had to accept the positions of the Companies as they were at the moment and decided to attack on a three Company front, C on the right, B in the centre, A on the left, each Company consisting on two platoons in depth. D Company which consisted of three platoons, was to support each of the other Companies with one platoon. Unfortunately, the officer commanding D Company, (2nd Lieutenant H. W. Purdy) was killed on his way back to his Company from my Headquarters, and his Company having no orders, and knowing nothing of the attack which was intended, did not leave the assembly trenches. When the Company Commanders returned to their Companies, they had 5 or 6 minutes in which to explain to their men the plan of attack, objective, and rate of barrage.
At 6.00pm the attack was launched and the result was very much as I had expected. The frontage was too wide for the Companies to keep in touch and an entry into the enemy trench was effected at isolated points. During the advance a good many casualties were suffered from our own barrage. When the men came under machine gun fire, they doubled forward and the officers and sergeants were unable, in the noise and excitement, to hold them back. A and B Companies were able to join up in the German front line. The trench on the left of A and on the right of B was still full of the enemy, and there was no sign of the battalion who, I had been told, were to do the mopping up. Heavy machine gun fire was coming from the enemy second line trench. As A Company was by this time reduced to about 19 men and B Company to about 16 men, it was impossible to advance further without leaving behind them an unmopped trench full of the enemy. All the officers of both Companies had become casualties and the NCOs in charge decided to hang on to what they had won. A similar state of affairs existed on the right where a sergeant of C Company with 13 men had assaulted and was holding on to a portion of the German front line trench, the only difference being, that whereas A and B Companies held on all night, the C Company party was ordered by an officer of another regiment to withdraw after dark. All these parties made their flanks secure with bombing posts and eked out their supply of bombs and ammunition by using those of the enemy.
During the period from 6.00pm till midnight, as I could not obtain definite information of the situation in front and no battalion had arrived to relieve men in the old front line, I decided to keep my three remaining platoons to garrison the old front line in view of the possibility of hostile counter-attack.
Moppers up. A quarter of an hour after Zero, 2 officers of the 18th Bn King’s (Liverpool) Regt reported to me for instructions. Up to this point I had been under the impression that the Moppers-up had already gone forward behind my leading waves. As by this time it was too late for them to do the actual work of mopping-up, I instructed them to move up and support the men of my battalion, who by this time would have reached or passed over the German front line. Of the further operations of this party, I cannot speak with certainty. One of the Officers reported to me about an hour and half later that his party had been wiped out with the exception of 4 or 5 men, and the other Officer had been killed and his party had disappeared.
About midnight the situation was relieved by the 2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt moving up in support, but at this time it was reported to me that there was a gap between my left and 131st Brigade and that the enemy were counter-attacking and breaking through at WANCOURT TOWER. I was ordered to get in touch at once with the Brigade on my left and arranged with them to throw in another battalion to close the gap. I at once visited the Headquarters of the battalion on my left and discussed the situation with 3 Commanding Officers of the neighbouring Brigade. The Officer Commanding the 8th Bn Durham Regt arranged to throw in one Company as a temporary measure and if necessary, to bring up further support to WANCOURT TOWER. As a matter of fact, I do not think that a serious gap ever existed at this point, and I am pretty certain that there is no evidence of the reported hostile counter-attack. Colonel Edwards of the 2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt who now took over the situation in the front line, had no difficulty in establishing touch with the 131st Brigade.
April 24th. At about 11.00am when the 2nd Bn Yorkshire Regt moved up to occupy the Blue Line, I moved forward the 3 platoons which were holding our old front line to occupy the German Support Line and made my Headquarters in the Quarry. Later, I collected the various parties which had made the attack the night before and further garrisoned the German Support Line.
In the evening, 4 strong points were constructed by the Royal Engineers in rear of the front line at O.31.a.2.2., O.31.a.9.9., O.25.d.4.5., O.25.b.8.0. Each of these was garrisoned by one platoon of the 19th Bn Manchester Regt under Sgt Ford, 2nd Lieutenant Fyfe, 2nd Lieutenant Cookson and 2nd Lieutenant Swann respectively. Battalion Headquarters remained at the Quarry. The garrisons further improved and strengthened these strong points.
April 25th. At 10.00pm Nos. 3 and 4 strong points were relieved by garrisons of the 89th Brigade, the battalion, less the 2 platoons garrisoning Nos.1 and 2 strong points, moved to trenches in N.89.c and Headquarters in sand bagged hut in N.29.c.6.4.
April 26th. Headquarters were moved to dug-out N.29.c.8.5.
April 27th. A working party of 150 O.R. under captain Boxall, who had come up from 1st Line Transport to relieve 2nd Lieutenant Cookson, was sent up to dig trenches behind the front line. This party came under artillery fire and suffered 6 casualties. It was back at its own trenches by 2.00am.
April 28th. 3 sections with 4 Lewis Guns were sent to garrison 4 Corps strong points at N.23.c.6.9., N.27.b.9.5., N.27.b.9.9 and N.22.c.3.6. Captain Boxall was in charge of these 4 posts, which were occupied by 12 noon. In the evening, the battalion was relieved by part of the 11th Bn Royal Fusiliers and part of the 6th Bn Northamptonshire Regt, and moved into trenches in N.27.b. The 4 Corps strong points were occupied until 6.30 on the morning of the 29th, when they were relieved by 8th Bn East Surrey Regt. Next morning, the battalion marched to ARRAS and entrained.
C. L. Macdonald, Major, Commanding, 19th Bn Manchester Regiment. 1.5.1917.