Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
He was the son of William Slingsby, a quarry works blacksmith, born 1854 in Groby, Leicestershire and his wife Lucy Slingsby (nee Strain, married in the 3rd quarter of 1877 in the West Derby, Lancashire district), a dress maker, born 1856 in Ireland. Albert Edward, a schoolboy, was born in the 1st quarter of 1893 in Croft, Leicestershire, his siblings were, Mary Ellen, a dress maker, born in the 2nd quarter of 1881 and Richard Arthur, a concrete works labourer, born in the 3rd quarter of 1886, both his siblings were born in Croft, in March 1901 the family home was at Peters Field, Croft. On the 20th May 1907 in Croft Parish Church, Albert’s widowed father married Sarah Robbins (nee Pulley). In April 1911 Albert was employed as a quarry works blacksmiths striker and was residing in the family home in Croft, together with his father, a blacksmith and his step mother, Sarah Slingsby, born 1867 in Temple Grafton, Warwickshire, also residing in the family home was Albert’s step sister, May Robbins, a schoolgirl, born 1899 in St. John’s, Leicester. Albert also had an older sibling, Ada Annie, born in the 1st quarter of 1889, in Croft. On the 9th September 1916, Albert married Winifred Grace Bennett in Croft Parish Church, Winifred was born in 1894 in Huncote, Leicestershire. Winifred married William J. Bisson in the 3rd quarter of 1921 in the Blaby, Leicestershire district.
Albert attested into the Army on a Short Service engagement (For the Duration of the War, with the Colours and in the Army Reserve.) on the 11th December 1915 in Leicester. He gave his age as 22 years and 11 months, his trade or calling as lathe engineer.
His medical examination recorded his birthplace Parish: Croft. County: Leicestershire.
Examined on: 11th December 1915. At: Leicester.
Declared age: 22 years 322 days.
Trade or Occupation: Lathe Engineer.
Height: 5 feet 6½ inches.
Weight: 132 pounds.
Chest measurement: Girth when fully expanded ? inches. Range of expansion ? inches.
Physical development: -?-.
After attestation on the 11/12/15 in Leicester he was transferred to the Army Reserve on the 11/12/15. Mobilized on the 28/6/16. Posted to the Leicestershire Regiment Depot as Private, service number 5166 on the 28/6/16. Posted to the -?- Embarked from Folkestone to join the British Expeditionary Force in France on the 26/?/17. Disembarked Boulogne on the 26/?/17. Posted to the 2/5th Battalion Nottinghamshire and Derby Regiment and allotted the service number, 202037 on the -?-. Reported sick to Field Ambulance in the field on the 19/4/17. Admitted to the 2/1st North Midland Field Ambulance, in the field suffering from a carbuncle on the 19/4/17. Rejoined the 2/5th Battalion Nottinghamshire and Derby Regiment, in the field on the 3/5/17. Wounded in action, in the field on the 26/9/17. Reported wounded and missing, in the field on the 26/9/17. Officially accepted as having died on or since the 26/9/17.
Albert’s widow was awarded a weekly pension of thirteen shillings and nine pence to commence on the 17th June 1918.
Albert’s surviving service documents are in a very poor condition, and much of the finer detail relating to the period of time that he spent in the Army, is either illegible or missing, hence the sparse overall description of his military and personal family history.
The War Diary records: 26 Sep-17 – ZERO DAY.
2.10 am. Companies reported in position ready for attack.
3.50 am. Commencement of bombardment of 2 hours duration previous to ZERO HOUR (Enemy Barrage retaliation on his Barrage Lines).
5.50 am. ZERO HOUR. For report on operations see description attached.
10.15 am. Battalion Headquarters move from CAPRICORN KEEP to GALLIPOLI.
6.00 pm. Commencement of Retrograde Movement (see description attached).
2/5th Battalion The Sherwood Foresters.
SECRET
Report on Operations 26th September 1917.
[1] GENERAL: On the morning of 26th instant, the Battalion under my Command attacked the enemy’s position, in conjunction with the troops of 178th Infantry Brigade, and in accordance with the orders received from the Brigadier General, 178th Infantry Brigade.
The role allotted to the Battalion was to support 2/8th Sherwood Foresters until their second objective had been reached and then to pass through them and capture and consolidate the line of the enclosure D.14.b.4.4 – D.14.d.7.7. OTTO FARM was then to be captured and held, and a line of posts was to be established on this general line.
[2] DISPOSITIONS: My dispositions were regulated by verbal instructions received from Brigadier General Commanding 178th Infantry Brigade, which entailed keeping one Company as a reserve in its forming up place and sending only two platoons forward to OTTO FARM.
I had previously determined that it would require two Companies to attack and hold OTTO FARM, but my plans had to be modified in accordance with the above.
“B” Company therefore was ordered to attack the enclosure D.14.b.4.4 and “C” Company to reach this line and when the barrage lifted off OTTO to attack it and hold it with two platoons, leaving the third to hold the line to “B” Company’s right.
“D” Company detailed one platoon to mop up for “B” and “C” Companies and the remainder were detailed as an immediate support to the two attacking Companies.
“A” Company was retained as a general reserve about AISNE FARM.
[3] APPRECIATION: As OTTO FARM was to be held I considered it important to ensure that the 177th Infantry Brigade on my right were fully cognisant of the fact and were prepared to establish a line of posts to protect its right flank.
On the afternoon of the 25th instant, I therefore sent my Adjutant to the 2/5th Lincolnshire Regiment to explain my plan and to impress the above point on them. He did not consider that the arrangements they had already made were sufficient for our support and informed 178th Infantry Brigade Headquarters of the fact. The two Brigades concerned then succeeded in co-ordinating a scheme which would ensure satisfactory mutual support between the two Battalions.
[4] ASSEMBLY LINES: Assembly positions were marked out in accordance with Brigade instructions, the front line of deployment being our line of emplacements D.13.c.2.6 and my left being on the road.
The depth of the Battalion was about 300 yards. “D” Company formed up behind “B” Company on left and “A” Company behind “C” Company on right.
At 4.00 am in reply to our preliminary bombardment, the enemy put down a heavy barrage and “D” and “A” Company suffered considerable casualties.
[5] THE ASSAULT: At 5.20 am the assault commenced and a general advance begun. From the outset the Battalion experienced great difficulties in maintaining direction. The WIELTJE – GRAVENSTAFEL Road was very difficult to determine and compasses proved unreliable.
The Battalion, however, succeeded in passing through 2/6th Sherwood Foresters to time and continued the attack. Very little opposition was encountered by my two attacking Companies but the greatest difficulty was still experienced in keeping organization and direction.
The thick fog and the dust and smoke giving the attackers all the difficulties of a night advance. The enclosure was captured by “B” Company, and Captain Littleboy, Commanding “C” Company collected his men preparatory to assaulting OTTO FARM. As the two platoons detailed for this purpose appeared too weak, captain Littleboy collected all of the men of his Company available.
[6] CAPTURE OF OTTO FARM: The Company advanced and got as close to the barrage as possible when it lifted the assault was delivered. A certain amount of opposition was encountered, but the place was bombed and most of the garrison ran out. Many were killed and about 40 prisoners were taken.
Touch was made with 177th Infantry Brigade on right.
[7] POSITION AFTER THE ASSAULT: At 10.00 am my situation was shown on attached Map A. Captain Swan and the remains of “B” Company were holding the enclosure and had pushed out a line of posts connecting it with OTTO FARM, and OTTO FARM was held by about 15 men of “C” Company. The remainder of these two Companies were either casualties or had lost their way and were not available for reserves. The whole of “B” Company had suffered very heavy and casualties from shell fire and all their officers had been wounded (N.B. this Company at the end of the day only numbered 28). Of these that were left, some had joined Captain Swan in the enclosure and others, Captain Littleboy in OTTO FARM. I therefore deemed it necessary to move forward to DEEP TRENCH D.14.d.1.9. This they had to do through a heavy barrage and as they had sustained heavy casualties before ZERO their fighting efficiency on arrival was very small.
[8] WITHDRAWAL FROM OTTO FARM: Meanwhile Captain Littleboy had personally been to see an officer of the 2/5th Lincolnshire Regiment on his right and had arranged with him for the protection of his right flank.
Shortly after this the enemy opened fire on the troops on his right, and they appeared to suffer heavily. They then withdrew about 500 yards leaving his right flank uncovered.
A defensive flank was then formed with a Lewis Gun and Captain Littleboy again when to the Battalion on his right and asked an officer why they had retired. He pointed out that OTTO FARM was beyond their objective and he did not propose to hold that forward line. Early in the afternoon a small local counter-attack on OTTO FARM was repulsed by rifle fire from the farm. About 5 o’clock the enemy opened a heavy barrage along the front, and particularly against the 177th Brigade on the right and the counter-attack was seen developing from North East DOCHY FARM. The retrograde movement of our troops in various parts could then be seen in progress and Captain Littleboy in OTTO FARM could see the enemy to his right rear threatening “B” Company in the enclosure and the line further to the left.
With the objective of preventing the apparent rolling up of the line the troops from OTTO FARM were withdrawn by him and the line of “B” Company was prolonged and covered to the right.
Just before it was dark, many of the troops who had retired returned, and the line was firmly established on the line of the enclosure.
[9] SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS: Little could be done in the way of re-organization during the night 26/27th as the situation was for a long time very obscure and it was considered more important for the troops of the Battalion, all of which were in the front line, to maintain the positions they were in. Further German counter-attacks were expected (N.B. the strength of the Battalion holding this line at present was 171). During the night stragglers were collected and a reserve of about 30 men was made near GALLIPOLI to which Battalion Headquarters had moved. About 4.00 am on the morning of the 27th, as soon as it was practical to do so, this reserve was ordered forward to about DEEP TRENCH, but as they were starting a very heavy hostile barrage was put down and their move was postponed until daylight, when it was cancelled. On the night of the 28/29th the Battalion was relieved by the 2/6th Sherwood Foresters and was reformed about GALLIPOLI where it remained in support of the 2/6th.
[10] GENERAL: All ranks displayed at all time an offensive and soldier like spirit and the men responded to every call made upon them. A number lost their way during the attack, but in practically every case I am satisfied they joined up as soon as possible.
During the retirement during the evening of the 26th some joined in, but the greater portion of them only retired on to the supporting troops two or three hundred yards in rear and soon came forward to rejoin their comrades.
15 of them reached WIELTJE and were returned on the following morning and a few were collected by me in the neighbourhood of GALLIPOLI.
I am in possession of the names of most of those who went past Battalion Headquarters and enquiry is being held into their conduct.
[11] HONOURS AND AWARDS: The names of those particularly deserving of award are being forwarded under separate cover.
[12] POINTS FOR CONSIDERATION: In accordance with 178th Infantry Brigade 688 G of the 1st October, I beg to bring forward the following points:-
[1] It was very difficult to find the final objective and to keep direction as stated in the above report.
[2] The Barrage was very suitable and troops could get within 50 yards of it. They however, continually got mixed up in it.
[3] Formations were suitable. It was found very hard to keep these formations owing to fog and smoke. They are however considered most suitable.
[4] The dress and equipment was satisfactory in every way excepting that bombs should be carried in the side pockets.
[5] Owing to the confusion during the first night, little could be done for the comfort of the assaulting troops.
[6] This was not satisfactory. Tapes should be put out at least the night before, and the Commanding Officer and Company Commanders given a chance of inspecting them. It would also be very useful if a map could be supplied showing 4 exact lines of enemy’s barrage. It requires watching carefully for at least three days previous to the attack. This can only be done satisfactorily by people living in the line.
[7] For the front line shell holes improved to shoot out of appear to be the best. No casualties were incurred by the Battalion after the termination of the fighting in the front line composed of shell holes, although it was heavily bombarded several times.
[8] If machine guns are allotted to Battalions they must join them in time to march to the position of assembly.