Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
He was the son of William Short, a painter, born 1851 in Melton Mowbray, Leicestershire and his wife Ann Short (nee Knapp, married in the 4th quarter of 1872 in the Melton Mowbray, Leicestershire district), born 1843 in Chadwell, Leicestershire. Samuel Christian was born in the 2nd quarter of 1882 in Melton Mowbray, his siblings were, Edward, a general labourer, born 1872, Thomas, a shoe trade worker, born 1874, James an errand boy, born 1879 and Harry, born 1886, all his siblings were born in Melton Mowbray, in April 1891 the family home was at 7, Bentley Street, Melton Mowbray. In the 4th quarter of 1892 in the Melton Mowbray district, Samuel’s mother died aged 50. In March 1901 Samuel was absent from the family home at 7, Bentley Street, Melton Mowbray, residing there was his widowed father, a house painter and his brother Harry, a pie works clerical worker, Samuel was employed as a general labourer and was residing as a boarder at 23, Scalford Road, Melton Mowbray. In the 2nd quarter of 1907 in the Melton Mowbray district, Samuel married Julia Violet Meadows, Julia was born in 1883 in Cottesmore, Rutland. In April 1911 Samuel was employed as a domestic coachman and was residing as a boarder at Rose Cottage, Lowick Bridge, Greenodd, Lancashire. In the 3rd quarter of 1912 in the Warwick district, Samuel’s wife Julia died aged 29.
The War Diary records: 12 Oct-17 – IN SUPPORT. NAMOR CROSSING . 2.00am. Commanding Officer and Adjutant go out to visit Companies and also to reconnoitre jumping off line. Heavy rain during the night and bitterly cold, men very cheerful. ZERO hour at 5.25am. Companies to form up on tape line at 4.45am. The Commanding Officer, Adjutant and Battalion Headquarter move up 20 yards in rear of jumping off line at 5.00am. All Companies lined up ready for attack by 5.05am. Report on attack, from 4.25am 12th Inst, as attached. Casualties during the attack 7 officers and 150 other ranks (Including Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel W.A. F. BARKER, D.S.O. and Lieutenant WILSON). Between 50 and 100 prisoners taken by 8th SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT in the attack.
REPORT ON THE ADVANCE OF THE 8TH BATTALION SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT IN THE ATTACK ON THE MORNING OF THE 12TH OCTOBER 1917.
FORMING UP.
At 4.25am on October 12th 1917, the 8th SOUTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGIMENT formed up on a tape stretching between the points U.12.d.76.95 and U.12.b.42.70 facing a direction of about 45˚ true bearing.
POSITIONS.
“B” Company (2nd Lieutenant R. W. A. GLEED) on the right and “A” Company (Captain O. BARLOW, M.C.) on the left in the front line. “D” Company (Captain P. A. W. CAME) right support and “C” Company (Captain L. J. KELSEY) left support.
ADVANCE.
At 5.25am the barrage came down 200 yards in front of and parallel to the tape line. The Battalion at once moved forward.
FORMATIONS.
The first half of each platoon of the two leading Companies were extended and formed one wave of two lines. The men being extended to about 8 paces. The second half of each of the leading Companies formed a “line of half platoons in file.” The two supporting Companies followed in Artillery Formation of Platoons in file. The depth of the ground covered by the Battalion was about 90 yards and the frontage of about 380 yards. At 5.31am the two leading Companies halted on a line U.12.b.95.12 to U.12.b.62.95. The supporting Companies closed up behind them. At 5.33am the Battalion resumed the advance closely following the barrage which had at this moment lifted 100 yards. The advance continued at the rate of 8 minutes per 100 yards until at 6.00am the left Company (“A”) reached its first objective. It appears that by this time the left Company “A” had closed a little to their right. All the Officers of this Company became casualties before the first objective was reached, and “C” Company supporting them had only one Officer left. “B” and “D” Companies had each two or three Officers. The retreating enemy made off in an Easterly direction for the Railway, and “A” Company being without Officers lost direction to some extent in following the enemy. The right Company (“B”) were very close to the barrage and had to hold back a little while “A” Company advanced and here again “A” Company appears to have closed to the right. At 6.05am the right Company (“B”) reached their first objective. There was now a decided gap in the line on the left of Battalion which appears to have been increased after the first objective was reached. At this stage Captain CAME of “D” Company seeing a gap on the left of “A” Company took up one platoon on a left incline to fill this gap. At the same time Colonel BARKER observing the gap sent forward one platoon of “C” Company under Sergeant Sims for the same purpose. This however was not done until the two leading Companies had passed to the right of ADEN HOUSE. Immediately after detailing the platoon of “C” Company to move forward Colonel BARKER was seriously wounded. “B” Company had now one Officer left, “C” Company one Officer and “D” Company two Officers. The right of “B” Company pushed on and reached their final objective i.e. TURENNE CROSSING. This was at 6.37am. The left of “B” Company hung back to keep in line with “A” Company who were held up on the road behind ADEN HOUSE. Then right of “A” Company rested on point V.1.c.74.37.
CONSOLIDATION.
The Battalion then consolidated on the South side of the TURENNE CROSSING – ANGLE POINT ROAD. At 6.40am the right of “A” Company was withdrawn about 50 yards for this purpose. Line ran across the railway at TURENNE CROSSING and along the road to point V.1.c.41.22. On this line “A” and “B” Companies with one platoon from “C” Company and one platoon from “D” Company, consolidated in an irregular line of shell holes. The remaining three platoons of “C” and three of “D” Company formed another irregular line of posts about 150 yards in rear. Casualties at 6.45am. About 200 Other Ranks, by noon there remained only the Adjutant, the Signalling Officer and 1 Company Officer. At 9.30pm on the 12th the Commanding Officer of the 1st GRENADIER GUARDS came to the Adjutant Lieutenant ARMSTRONG, who was in command of the Battalion and told him he had orders to clear the ground, in conjunction with the BORDER REGIMENT between ANGLE POINT, EGYPT HO and the Railway. He asked Lieutenant ARMSTRONG to warn his Companies which he did, but they reported that nothing happened. About noon on the 13th Major IRWIN Commanding the 7th BORDER REGIMENT called at Battalion Headquarters and told Lieutenant ARMSTRONG that he had to meet the Commanding Officer of the 1st GRENADIER GUARDS, with reference to the clearing up of ADEN HOUSE. The latter however did not turn up. Major IRWIN then sent for one of his Company Commanders and gave him instructions to take ADEN HOUSE with 1 Officer and 35 Other Ranks. This party was shelled on their way up about 2.30am on the 14th inst., and they returned without having done anything.
RELIEF.
The Battalion was relieved about 4.45am on the 14th and the dispositions handed over were as indicated on page 1. There was a gap of about 200 yards between the left of the Battalion and the right of the 1st GRENADIER GUARDS. A copy of Lieutenant ARMSTRONG’S final report of his position is attached hereto. It would appear that the loss of direction after passing the first objective and the consequent failure of the left of the Battalion to reach the final objective are due to the following causes.
1 - The extremely heavy casualties to Officers in the early stages of the attack, and that there was no Officer to Command “A” Company (the left Company in the front line) when the first objective was reached.
2 – That the few Officers left did not realise that as the attack progressed the frontage of the Battalion had to be increased from 340 yards at the jumping off tape to about 550 yards on the final objective.
3 – The retreat of the enemy across our front to the railway drew platoons without Officers after them, and so a gap was left on the left flank, and the right became congested. The Battalion was in touch with the 1st GRENADIER GUARDS when they left the jumping off tape. During the whole of the 12th it was impossible to obtain communication with the front line owing to the accuracy of enemy snipers. Reports as to the position of the line could only be based on information received from casualties passing to the rear. Though the first reports of the position of the front line proved inaccurate I do not consider that this was any fault of the Adjutant’s. He was Commanding the Battalion with only one Company Officer remaining and that one wounded. He would have been unwise to attempt to reconnoitre the front line during daylight, after every orderly he had sent 15 in all had been sniped. In my opinion he had carried on remarkably well under the most difficult circumstances. He informs me that he several times asked for some reinforcement Officers to be sent up but none arrived.
Signed W. GIBSON, Major. Commanding 8th Bn. South Staffordshire Regt. 15-10-17.
On Friday February 22nd 1918 The Melton Mowbray Times & Vale of Belvoir Gazette published the following article under the heading. “BIRTHS, MARRIAGES AND DEATHS.” – ROLL OF HONOUR. – SHORT.- Killed in action in France on Oct. 26th, 1917, 25733 Lance Corpl. Samuel Short, South Staffordshire Regt. (son of Mr. William Short of Melton Mowbray), aged 35 years.