Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
He was the son of William Jones, an elastic web loom maker, born 22nd March 1866 in Loughborough, Leicestershire and his wife Mary Elizabeth Jones (nee Elliott, married on the 25th December 1897 in Holy Trinity Church, Loughborough, Leicestershire), born 21st May 1876 in Rempstone, Nottinghamshire. Albert was born in the 3rd quarter of 1898 in Loughborough and was baptised on the 22nd April 1900 in the Parish Church, Quorn, Leicestershire he had one sibling, Edith May, born 4th March 1900 in Quorn and baptised on the 22nd April 1900 in the Parish Church, Quorn, in March 1901 the family home was at School Lane, Quorn. In April 1911 Albert was residing in the family home at Nursery Lane, Quorn, together with his father, an engine fitter, his mother and siblings Edith and Charles Ernest, born 2nd August 1907 in Quorn and baptised on the 15th December 1907 in the Parish Church, Quorn, also residing with the family was Albert’s widowed maternal Grandfather, Anthony Elliott, born 1840 in Countesthorpe, Leicestershire. In 1939 Albert’s father, a retired loom fitter and his mother were residing in the family home at 3, Mansfield Avenue, Quorn. Albert also had another sibling, Alberta Muriel, born in the 2nd quarter of 1918 in Quorn, but who died in the 3rd quarter of 1918.
Albert’s Army enlistment documents do not survive, all that is known of his military service is that after enlistment he was allotted the service number1/4534 and posted as a Private to the Training Reserve Battalion, subsequently being transferred to the 2nd Battalion Seaforth Highlanders as a Private and allotted the service number S/23017, and it was with this unit that he first entered the theatre of war in France. He was killed in action on the 4th October 1917 the opening day of the Battle of Broodseinde. Albert was awarded the British War Medal and Victory Medal.
The War Diary records: 4 Oct-17 – A resume of the attack is attached and of the two following days.
Captain MACPHERSON and Captain J. G. WOOD, M.C, killed in action.
Lieutenant R. F. NORBURY, died of wounds.
2nd Lieutenant H. P. MMACKAY, 2nd Lieutenant A. J. BROWN, 2nd Lieutenant R. JACKSON, 2nd Lieutenant C. W. LOVEGROVE, 2nd Lieutenant R. W. C. LATTA (died of wounds), 2nd Lieutenant A. D. BROTHERTON, 2nd Lieutenant W. K. COCHRANE. 2nd Lieutenant W. F. MACDONALD, wounded.
2nd Lieutenant E. N. CHADWICK and 2nd Lieutenant D. M. MACRAE, wounded and missing. Captain L. GJERS, 2nd Lieutenant J. RAE, 2nd Lieutenant D. McN. F. TARRATT, missing.
Other Ranks. Killed 23. Wounded 228. Wounded and missing 29. Missing 71.
2nd Bn. Seaforth Highlanders
War Diary of Operations for period 4th – 6th October 1917.
4th October 17. The Battalion formed up for attack by Zero minus 1 hour on correct alignment with 1st HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT on right and with 1st ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS on left. Companies were close up to total depth of 120 yards to get clear of EAGLE TRENCH which would have broken formations. Two leading platoons of each assaulting Companies carried trench boards in case of difficulty being found in crossing water and marsh between starting point and KANGAROO TRENCH and LAUDETBEEK. Platoons were to advance in succession under cover of the creeping barrage at correct distances of 100 yards between platoons and 150 yards between Companies with moppers and Company Headquarters 50 yards in rear of the last platoon of each Company.
At Zero hour (6.00am) leading platoons advanced under barrage but found great difficulty in keeping alignment owing to water forcing them to follow best ground over the marsh. This created confusion and resulted in formation of assaulting Companies being lost, especially on left where the leading wave walked into our own barrage. KANGAROO TRENCH was reached without Companies and platoons being able to disentangle themselves, enemy who showed resistance being bayoneted and remainder being passed back. A total of about 25 were taken prisoner on Battalion front up to KANGAROO TRENCH inclusive and several of them were killed by enemy barrage fire on their way back. The left assaulting Company met with some resistance and did not take many prisoners Company Sergeant Major BAIN killing 15 enemy to his own bayonet. As the advance proceeded Companies endeavoured to regain formation but this was found to be impossible owing to confusion and the excited condition of the men. Up to BEEK STREET TRENCH casualties were not heavy, but from that point onwards Machine Gun fire was encountered from U.18.c.95, U.18.d.05.25, and from left flank generally, and this fire caused considerable casualties, both Company Commanders and 6 of the 8 Platoon Commanders of the two left Companies being put out of action. Continuing their advance towards their objective the left Companies captured the fortified houses at U.18.d.30.55, and the right Companies advanced over 19 METRE HILL. The left Companies were unable to advance further than the line U.18.d.75.20 – U.18.d.60.35 where the remaining men established themselves in shell holes. The reports received during the action from 2nd Lieutenant LOVEGROVE and MACDONALD are attached [1]. These two Officers were the only two unwounded Platoon Commanders of the two left Companies at that time, and they both became casualties later. The right assaulting Company captured 19 METRE HILL but lost heavily on appearing over the far slope and could not get further than U.18.d.7.4, where they remained in touch with the 1st HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT on their right. The strength of this Company was, at that time 1 Officer (Captain WOOD) and about 30 other ranks unwounded [2]. The right supporting Company sustained heavy casualties from Machine Gun fire coming from their left flank and its advance appears to have come to an end on the objective I had assigned to it in the event of the right assaulting Company being able to capture the first objective unaided and I think Captain GYERS, who Commanded the right supporting Company was quite unaware that the Company he was supporting had sustained heavy losses on the far slope of 19 METRE HILL. One of his Platoons had lost direction and had gone too much to the right and the 2nd Platoon had lost heavily and was without leaders. He therefore went forward with one Platoon towards the crest of the hill and ordered 2nd Lieutenant COCHRANE to dig in with the remaining Platoon on the reverse slope. What happened after this is not clear as Captain GYERS is “missing,” but it is supposed that he became a casualty and that the Platoon retired on finding themselves without a leader. This retirement from the hill was probably responsible for the report which reached me that we were retiring from the ground we had captured on the right of the 10th Infantry Brigade front. The retirement of this Platoon was on to XI Brigade ground and their whereabouts was unknown to me until later in the day when I received a message from Officer Commanding 1st HAMPSHIRE REGIMENT that some of my men were in a trench in front of LOUIS FARM. There was no excuse for this retirement beyond the fact that the men were without leaders and had sustained considerable casualties and it unfortunately gave me the belief that 19 METRE HILL had been captured, whereas this was not the case. Captain WOOD and party being fairly established at U.18.d.7.4 on the far slope of the hill and 2nd Lieutenant COCHRANE’s Platoon on the reverse slope about U.18.d.4.3.
At 6.20am I had ordered the Officer Commanding 2 Companies 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT to advance his leading Companies to EAGLE TRENCH [3] as soon as I saw the attack looked like going through, but the Companies began to arrive 10 minutes later so I presume it moved forward without my order. On the arrival of the Officer Commanding “B” Company I ordered him to advance his Company to KANGAROO TRENCH and to be ready to advance to BEEK AVENUE on the arrival of “C” Company 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT which he informed me was on its way up from AREA “A” East of LANGEMARCK [4]. My plan was to use the 2 Companies 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT placed under my orders as a support and counter-attacking force to maintain the ground gained and therefore placed them where they would be handy for such a purpose and out of the enemy barrage area East and West of EAGLE TRENCH. The 2nd Company 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT, consisting of 2 Platoons “C” Company, arrived shortly after and I sent them forward to KANGAROO TRENCH in relief of “B” Company which advanced to BEEK AVENUE as previously ordered. Captain EGERTON who was in Command of these 2 Companies (less 2 Platoons) was ordered by me to use his Command as a support to 19 METRE HILL and the 10th Brigade front generally, not to hesitate to counter-attack on the first sign of the line giving way and to keep 1 Company within striking distance of 19 METRE HILL for that purpose. I consider this Officer showed coolness and good judgement throughout, the advance of his men was in every way creditable, and their support contributed in great measure to the maintenance of the ground gained earlier in the day. Later in the day the enemy delivered a counter-attack against 19 METRE HILL and from the direction of OLGA HOUSES, but this was easily repulsed on the left. On the right the enemy succeeded in crossing the road in front of 19 METRE HILL and managed to establish themselves in the road bank and shell holes in the rear, but they were unable to advance further. Captain WOOD, who Commanded the party on the forward slope of 19 METRE HILL was unfortunately killed when running with Lewis Gun magazines to the Gun on his right. 2nd Lieutenant LOVEGROVE and MACDONALD, the two Officers on the left were both wounded and the front line was now left without Officers but the men held their ground. Captain EGERTON, 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT actively supported the line by moving his men forward, and they sustained considerable casualties in doing so, the Machine Gun fire from the left and left rear being accurately brought to bear on any target presenting itself. This fire came mainly from the high ground on the left of the XXIX Division front and was long range fire; it commanded the ground from AREA “A” to the reverse slope of 19 METRE HILL and rendered the work of Runners and carrying parties to and from the front line very hazardous. The work of these parties was carried on throughout the action and enabled connection and supply of ammunition to be maintained.
At 7.30am I advanced my Battalion Headquarters to KANGAROO TRENCH but found myself cut off from connection with front and rear, all the Signallers whom I took forward with me becoming casualties on the way up, my Battalion Headquarters Sergeant and 2 Runners being killed, and finding it impossible to either receive or send messages I returned to my first Headquarters at EAGLE TRENCH. Battalion Headquarters and 2 Companies 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT arrived shortly afterwards and in consultation with Lieutenant Colonel CAULTENY, Commanding 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT the 2 Companies were dispersed between KANGAROO and EAGLE TRENCHES. Battalion Headquarters and 3 Companies 1st Battalion ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT were moved up under orders of General Officer Commanding 10th Infantry Brigade on information received that line was reported to be falling back from 19 METRE HILL [5 & 6], and arrived at EAGLE TRENCH between 5.00 and 5.30pm. The line was not falling back as they carried out their orders under BM9 of 4th to reinforce the firing line. Captain MACKENZIE, 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT was in Command of these three Companies and he was instructed to fill the gap from U.18.d.2.3 to U.18.c.98.5.7 with 1 Company and to place the remaining 2 Companies across the Brigade front within supporting distance of 19 METRE HILL, holding these 2 Companies in readiness to advance to reinforce the front line, counter-attacking if necessary. Two Guns, 10th Brigade MACHINE GUN COMPANY were sent forward with these 3 Companies by my order, the Companies of the 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT being very weak in numbers. This advance took place in daylight but dark was gathering and practically no casualties were sustained. The Companies unfortunately bore too far to the left and a message was later received by the Officer Commanding 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT to say his left was in touch with the right Company 1st ROYAL DUBLIN FUSILIERS at the pill box at U.18.c.50.45, his other Companies being in line from there to about U.18.c.9.2, no sign of any other British troops having been -?-. I discussed the situation with the Officer Commanding 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT and urged the necessity of sending a Senior Officer forward to ascertain the exact position of his 3 Companies and to move them to the position assigned to them on the 10th Brigade front. At the same time 1 Officer from 2nd SEAFORTH HIGHLANDERS and 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT were sent forward by my order to assist in the connecting up of the front line and the distribution in depth of the available troops for the defence of the 10th Brigade frontage. The Officer Commanding 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT and his Adjutant Captain WILLIS performed this duty for his own Battalion and reported that he had ordered Captain MACKENZIE to extend to the right and move forward half right to his correct position.
5th October 17. Nothing of importance occurred during the 5th beyond the line of the 3 Companies 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT being advanced a short distance half right, their left resting on the road about U.18.c.9.5. The line was taken over by the 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT on the night of 5th/6th, the relief being completed by 3.00am.
General. I am of the opinion that the objective of the Battalion was attained and that the large number of Officers and men who are still reported missing supports this theory, in addition to the reports of contact aeroplanes. The retirement of the Platoon without leaders which was observed and reported from various sources gave a totally wrong impression of the true position, and the information gathered by 2nd Lieutenant A. D. BROTHERTON who was sent forward by me to reconnoitre the position early on the 4th would probably have corrected this had he not been severely wounded by shell fire when making his way back. This Officer managed to crawl back but fainted from loss of blood before he could deliver his report. He acted with great gallantry.
A list of casualties reported up to 12 noon, 1/10/17 is attached [7]. Apart from the names of Officers, NCO’s and men of my own Battalion which I will later on bring forward for attention. I wish to mention the names of Captain EGERTON, 3/10th MIDDLESEX REGIMENT for sound judgement and coolness in action – of the Officer Commanding 2 Guns 10th TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY who went forward with his Guns with the 3 Companies 1st ROYAL WARWICKSHIRE REGIMENT after being wounded and somewhat shaken – of the Corporal who went with him in charge of 1 Gun and to pay tribute to the work of the carrying party attached to my Battalion from the HOUSEHOLD BATTALION under Command of Lieutenant BARKER. They had many casualties and were always ready to perform another journey when necessary.
10/10/17
R. Laing, Lieutenant Colonel
Commanding 2/Seaforth Highlanders