Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
He was the son of Mr and Mrs Chas. Hubbard of 12, Belton Street, Stamford, Lincs., and late of Tinwell, Rutland, and the husband of Mrs Lucy French (formerly Hubbard) of 55, Bridge Street, Stantonbury, Wolverton, Bucks. Before enlistment he had been employed as a farm labourer. He proceeded to France with the original British Expeditionary Force on the 12th August 1914. He fought at Loos, Ypres, Mons, Aubers Ridge, Givenchy and in numerous other engagements, and was awarded two distinctions, the Distinguished Conduct Medal and the Russian Medal of the Order of St. George, these being won on the 9th May 1915 at Aubers Ridge for bravery in voluntarily taking important messages to officers under fire, and at great risk to himself, and for binding up the injuries of wounded men one of whom he carried to a place of safety, although himself exposed to the danger of enemy fire. He wrote home and gave his own version events as follows:- “On the morning of the 9th May, the regiment had orders to take the German trenches at Aubers Ridge. We arrived at the trenches on the 8th and had to carry several ladders and lots of other things for the purpose of getting out of the trenches. We had two companies in the front line of trenches, and two in reserve. I was doing orderly to the Adjutant when the first two companies went over, and the other two took their place in the front line. While we were going along the communication trench Colonel Dubbin was hit with a hard piece of earth which was thrown from the burst of a shell, and we all thought he was wounded. I had a piece hit me at the same time, but it did no damage. The regiment tried to take the German trench, but found that the barbed wire was not cut, and we could not get through. The Colonel gave the Adjutant a message to be sent to the officer out between our lines and the Germans, and he asked me to take it if I thought it was possible. I took it, and when I reached the Captain I found him and his servant dead, so I crawled about until I found another officer, and I gave him the message, and as soon as he got it, he was wounded in the foot. He sat up to cut his boot off, and was shot again in the chest, but he signed my messages, and I crawled back again to the Colonel. While I was doing so, I bound several of the wounded up, and the Colonel saw me and said he would do what he could for me. As soon as ever I got back again the Adjutant asked me if I would try and take another one, and I told him I didn’t want to, but I would try. I managed to find another officer, and gave him the message, and coming back, bought a wounded man back with me, and then when I got into the trench I helped to bind the wound up. Then the regiment of the Black Watch had a go at taking the trench we couldn’t take and they found the same obstacle as our. . . That is how I got the medals.” He was killed by a shell during the Battle of Givenchy. He was married at St Laud’s Church, Sherington, Buckinghamshire to Miss Lucy Robinson on the 19th August 1916. The entry in the London Gazette for the 11th March 1916 reads as follows:- 9620 Lance Corporal G. H. Hubbard 1st Bn. Northamptonshire Regiment. For conspicuous gallantry in twice crawling out from his trench under heavy fire in order to pass orders to other companies. The citation in the London Gazette dated 11th March 1916 reads:- “For conspicuous gallantry in twice crawling out from his trench under heavy fire in order to pass orders to other companies.” At the time of the citation George held the rank of Lance Corporal and was serving with the 1st Battalion of the Northamptonshire Regiment. The War Diary for the 31st July 1917 records. The Battalion (“A” and “C” Companies) attacked the enemy line at SHREWSBURY FOREST at 3.50am this morning during which the Commanding Officer (Lt. Col. E. R. MOBBS, D.S.O.) was killed. Lt. Col. E. R. MOBBS, D.S.O. killed, 2nd Lt. T. P. LITCHFIELD, killed, 2nd Lt. L. H. HALLIDAY missing, 2nd Lt. T. WARD missing, Captain A. O. MARSHALL wounded, Lt. S. H. MOTION wounded, Lt. A. F. J. R. GEORGE wounded, 2nd Lt. W. H. CAWSTON wounded, 2nd Lt. F. L. FRANKLIN wounded, 2nd Lt. L. J. LAYCOCK wounded, 2nd Lt. A. H. WEBB wounded, 2nd Lt. C. D. MORGAN wounded. Other ranks killed 37, wounded 162, missing 47. Total 246. See Appendix “A” for report on the action. Congratulatory Memo received from the Brigadier General Commanding 73rd Infantry Brigade (See Appendix “B”).

APPENDIX “A”
7th SERVICE BATTALION NORTHAMPTONSHIRE REGIMENT
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS IN SHREWSBURY FOREST 31st JULY 1917

29th JULY 1917
Battalion Headquarters, “C”, “D” and “B” Companies went up to the forward area on the afternoon and evening of the 29th July 1917 (“A” Company was ordered to remain in camp on account of the trenches it was to occupy being flooded).
“C” Company relieved part of the 9th ROYAL SUSSEX REGT in 5 front line posts and the trenches about IMAGE TRENCH.
“D” Company took CANADA STREET TUNNELS.
“B” Company in LARCH WOOD TUNNELS.
“B” COMPANY suffered 5 other rank casualties through enemy gas shells on the march to the forward area and Lt. CAWSTON was wounded. Other Companies had no casualties.
Owing to the heavy rain and many shell holes the ground was in very bad condition.
Battalion Headquarters were established in CANADA STREET TUNNELS which were very wet and crowded with troops making progress through the tunnels very slow.
30th JULY 1917
Situation normal throughout the day except that enemy heavily shelled IMAGE SUPPORT, ILLUSIVE SUPPORT and CENTRAL AVENUE at 1.46am and 4.00pm. Enemy split red lights preceded the former shelling.
“A” Company marched from camp and occupied METROPOLITAN Left at 4.00pm, where they rested until night time and had tea.
A conference of Company Commanders was held at Battalion Headquarters at 5.00pm and notification that ZERO hour for the attack on the following morning was to be 3.50am was received before the conclusion of the conference – also correct time for synchronisation.
About 9.30pm Lt. Colonel MOBBS, D.S.O. (Commanding) went forward with Lt. Colonel MURPHY, D.S.O., M.C. (Officer Commanding 2nd LEINSTER REGT) and 2nd Lt. F. R. BERRIDGE, M.C. (Intelligence Officer 73rd Infantry Brigade) to ascertain the position of the stakes which had previously been put out by the 9th ROYAL SUSSEX REGT to mark the outer flanks of the assaulting Companies of the two Battalions in their forming up positions. These were found by moonlight, and 2nd Lt. BERRIDGE remained out to put out tape to mark the line upon which the Companies would form up.
During this time Battalion Headquarters were moved to another part of CANADA STREET TUNNELS. “A” and “C” Companies with “D” Company in support were formed up behind the tape line by 3.30am. This operation was begun at midnight as it was necessary to allow plenty of time for the Companies to find their positions without noise, and also for “D” Company to get out of CANADA STREET TUNNELS. Previous to ZERO (3.50am) the Germans were shelling moderately in “NO MANS LAND” causing some casualties amongst our troops who were forming up for the attack. A German barrage fell 50 to 100 yards in front of our forming up line less than three minutes after ZERO causing rather heavy casualties, including that of two officers. At the same time enemy shells fell 100 to 150 yards behind our own front line, but this could not be described as a barrage. The rapidity with which the enemy barrage opened would appear to show that he was expecting the attack.
Owing to the darkness the assaulting Companies were unable to keep a correct line, and also the men were inclined to “bunch” which it was difficult to prevent until daylight.
However owing to the same cause, ie: the darkness direction was undoubtedly lost from the beginning of the advance.
It appears that German machine guns were brought forward from JEER TRENCH into shell holes in front of it before our barrage reached them. They were thus quite (sic) while our barrage was piling up on JEER TRENCH.
Our assaulting troops being held up were unable to keep up with the barrage, lost direction, and became disorganised. The machine guns already referred to were dealt with enabling a further advance to be made across JEER TRENCH, but again German machine guns enfiladed us from LOWER STAR POST, which was then on our left flank and to our rear, which the enemy still continued to hold. The line reached is shown on the attached map
The assaulting Companies at this time were highly disorganised – had no connection with their left – and had no officers. It was then that the Commanding Officer Lt. Col. E. R. MOBBS, D.S.O., and 2nd Lt. BERRIDGE, M.C. arrived in the front line. The former with a handful of men charged the enemy machine gun post, and was seriously wounded. Before dying he wrote out a message to his Battalion Headquarters for reinforcements to be sent forward, and stating that he was seriously wounded – an act showing his devotion to duty at the last. The message however was never delivered.
It must be stated here that the capture of the first objective of blue line had been reported. This was correct as far as the Battalion front was concerned – but LOWER STAR POST, on our left, had not been captured. It had however been reported by walking wounded that the second objective, (or the black line) had been captured. It was then that Col. MOBBS decided to go forward to ascertain the situation.
Lt. Col. MOBBS’ daring and extraordinary courage being known he was restrained from leaving his Headquarters for half an hour, but at the end of that time he definitely decided to go forward with a view to personally supervising the consolidation of the ground captured and of selecting a position for advance Battalion Headquarters.
Before doing so he ordered “B” Company (in reserve) to advance, occupy and consolidate JEER TRENCH.
In a most critical situation when the two assaulting Companies had lost all their officers, 2nd Lt. F. R. BERRIDGE, M.C. with the assistance of Company Sergeant Major AFFORD and Sergeant TWENTYMAN reorganised the line and sent in a report to Battalion Headquarters. Upon receipt of this report “D” Company of the 13th MIDDLESEX REGT was sent forward to JEER TRENCH with special instructions to gain connection on the flanks. This Company suffered heavy casualties in going forward and is reported to have crossed JEER TRENCH and later to have withdrawn and “dug in” between ILLUSIVE DRIVE and ILLUSIVE RESERVE believing that none of our troops were in front of them.
The Trench Mortar Subsection also withdrew to that line from J.25.c.55.25. a German Trench Mortar position they had occupied believing it to be the one shown in aeroplane photographs about J.25.d.00.68., but owing to LOWER STAR POST being still held by the enemy it was decided to withdraw our advance troops to about the line of ILLUSIVE AVENUE and to consolidate strong posts on that line, and establish communication with a NORTHAMPTON strong point at J.31.a.5.7. and a LEINSTER strong point at J.25.a.4.4.
An amended order was sent to Officer Commanding “D” Company, 13th MIDDLESEX REGT.
2nd Lt. BERRIDGE again went forward to effect this withdrawal which he successfully accomplished, showing the utmost gallantry and dash, establishing a line of strong posts under heavy machine gun and shell fire. Several messages he sent back during the time he was forward did not reach Battalion Headquarters the runners having lost their way. He reported personally afterwards. 2nd Lt. BERRIDGE’s work cannot be overstated, and it was due to his efforts and devotion to duty that the situation was cleared. A carrying party was organised to take wire, sandbags, water and ammunition to the posts which had been established but it took many hours to find the way.
Stretcher bearers had suffered heavy casualties so that 12 reserve stretcher bearers were sent for from the back area, and in the meantime, on account of the large numbers of wounded who were lying out, stragglers (men who had lost their way etc) were collected and placed at the disposal of the Medical Officer. Many of these men did most excellent work, and the greater portion of the area was cleared by nightfall.
The relief of the Battalion, partly by the 1st NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT and partly by the 15th MIDDLESEX REGT was ordered on ZERO evening. Runners were sent forward to bring in guides from the posts. This was just before dark. The runners failed to find the posts and the guides never arrived. It being considered inadvisable to carry out the relief by night it was not commenced until about 4.00am the following day 1st August 1917.
Great credit is due to 2nd Lt.s GORRINGE, WILLIAMS and WILD, and the N.C.O.s and men with them in holding these posts during the night under heavy shell fire, and in the most trying circumstances.
During the morning of the 1st August 1917, the 1st NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT relieved the three right posts of the Battalion and the 13th MIDDLESEX REGT relieved five posts on the left.
The former had been formed on the 72nd Brigade front when direction had been lost. The relief was completed by 11.45am.
A dump of barrage rations, water and rum was formed at CANADA STREET TUNNELS for the men on their way back to camp. It had rained incessantly throughout the operations and the men were thoroughly exhausted, wet through and covered in mud.
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LOWER STAR POST
LOWER STAR POST proved to be the key of the situation, and undoubtedly was the cause of holding up the attack, and preventing the final objective being taken.
It is considered that the boundary between the two Units should not have passed so close to such a strong point but that special assaulting troops should have been detailed to envelope the post.
ZERO
If ZERO HOUR is during darkness it is extremely difficult for assaulting troops to keep proper direction and a correctly extended line. To ensure a successful operation from the start it would seem advisable that ZERO HOUR should be during daylight.
REPORTS
A line of objective should not be reported as captured until it is ascertained that the flanks have been secured and communication obtained on the right and left. It is dangerous to base reports on the statements of wounded.
STATE OF GROUND
Operations were undoubtedly handicapped by the bad condition of the ground owing to the severe weather which existed previous to and on the 31st July 1917. This also to a certain extent withheld the assaulting troops from keeping close in to our barrage, the rate of advance of which is considered to have been too fast under the circumstances.
MAP READING
The question of map reading generally, knowing one’s key position and finding the way especially at night proved exceedingly difficult. This was principally due to the similarity of the ground and lack of landmarks. The use of a compass with a large scale clearly contoured map would appear to have been the only safe method to adopt. It is not considered that the large SHREWSBURY FOREST map was adaptable to the circumstances.
SANITATION
Latrine accommodation in CANADA STREET TUNNELS was practically nil. No special latrine could be claimed and looked after by any one Battalion, because troops in the TUNNELS belonged to several Regiments. It would have been advantageous if a Brigade Sanitary Section had been organised to make and look after latrines. This would have probably decreased to large amount of urinating in the TUNNELS.
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6/8/17 Captain
7th Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment.

Source: Leicestershire War Memorials Project.
Photograph taken from G. Phillips 'Rutland and the Great War', and reproduced with kind permission of Rutland Remembers website :
http://www.rutlandremembers.org/fallen/238/hubbard-corporal-george-henry-dcm