Source: Michael Doyle Their Name Liveth For Evermore: The Great War Roll of Honour for Leicestershire and Rutland.
PD.The 1911 census records for Dartmouth Road, Olney, Bucks. Oliver Mobbs head of the family, a widower and an Iron Founder, born 1851 in London, also Edgar, son, single and a Manager of a Motor Garage, born 1882 in Northampton, Charles, son, a Schoolboy, born 1898 in Olney, Bucks., Olive, daughter, single, born 1884 in Northampton and Emma Mobbs, cousin, single, born 1851 in Northampton, additionally Minnie Abraham, servant, single and a General Domestic, born 1886 in Earls Barton, Northants. He was the son of Oliver and Elizabeth Mobbs. He was educated at Bedford Modern School, where he excelled in Football, Cricket and Rugby. On leaving school at the age of 16 he was employed at the Pythchley Autocar Company, this Company was owned by his elder brother Noel. Edgar became a member of the Weston Turks Rugby Club in 1904, and the following year made the move to Northampton Rugby Club (The Saints) where he was Captain from 1907 until 1913. During this time he was selected and played at International level for England against Australia, France, Ireland, Wales and Scotland, retiring at the end of 1913. He was now managing one of the Pytchley Autocar branches in Market Harborough, Leicestershire. At the outbreak of hostilities Edgar, who had wanted to serve as an officer, but was considered too old, enlisted as a Private in the Northamptonshire Regiment, and was posted to “D” Company of the 7th Battalion. Within a matter of weeks Edgar had attained the rank of Sergeant and was soon accepted for a temporary commission to Lieutenant. After training the Battalion finally embarked for France and Flanders arriving on the 2nd September at Boulogne, by now Edgar had been promoted to Captain at the beginning of July 1915, and Major just after his arrival in France. The 73rd Brigade of the 24th Division was immediately in action at the Battle of Loos on the 25th September 1915, during this engagement the 7th Battalion lost 11 officers and 377 men, the Commanding Officer Lt. Col. Arthur Parkin was also killed during this action and Edgar took command, a few months later he was made Commanding Officer of the Battalion. In August 1916 the 7th Battalion again found itself engaged in action during the Battle of the Somme and Edgar was hit by a piece shrapnel, being evacuated to Hospital in Rouen. He was evacuated by Hospital Ship on the 22nd August from Le Havre to Southampton, and then on to Hospital in Northampton. For his actions on the Somme he was awarded the Distinguished Service Order in January 1917. In October 1916 he was again fit and able to return to his Battalion rejoining them in France. In July 1917 the 24th Division transferred to the Ypres sector and the Battalion found itself in the front line in Armagh Wood at Zillebeke, they were providing a protective flank for the 30th Division which was tasked with attacking the Menin Road. The 7th Battalion were just in front of Mount Sorrel, when in the early morning the men went over the top and made their way across no mans land towards the enemy positions, they were halfway towards Shrewsbury Forest when they came under heavy fire on both flanks, in particular the fire from Lower Star Post was devastating and tore the advancing ranks to shreds. Most of the Company officers were either killed or wounded, leaving the men disorientated. The reports that arrived at HQ were contradictory with no clear picture of the events taking place, Edgar therefore decided to take a look for himself, and together with 2nd Lt. Berridge M.C. gathered a handful of men and made their way to the front line positions. On arrival, taking some men with him Edgar charged a machine gun post, falling mortally wounded into a shell hole with a bullet in the neck, though he managed to indicate to a runner the positions on a map of the pockets of resistance, the message never arrived at HQ. Edgar’s body was never recovered. The War Diary entry for the 31st July 1917 records. The Battalion (“A” and “C” Companies) attacked the enemy line at SHREWSBURY FOREST at 3.50am this morning during which the Commanding Officer (Lt. Col. E. R. MOBBS, D.S.O.) was killed. Lt. Col. E. R. MOBBS, D.S.O. killed, 2nd Lt. T. P. LITCHFIELD, killed, 2nd Lt. L. H. HALLIDAY missing, 2nd Lt. T. WARD missing, Captain A. O. MARSHALL wounded, Lt. S. H. MOTION wounded, Lt. A. F. J. R. GEORGE wounded, 2nd Lt. W. H. CAWSTON wounded, 2nd Lt. F. L. FRANKLIN wounded, 2nd Lt. L. J. LAYCOCK wounded, 2nd Lt. A. H. WEBB wounded, 2nd Lt. C. D. MORGAN wounded. Other ranks killed 37, wounded 162, missing 47. Total 246. See Appendix “A” for report on the action. Congratulatory Memo received from the Brigadier General Commanding 73rd Infantry Brigade (See Appendix “B”).

APPENDIX “A”
7th SERVICE BATTALION NORTHAMPTONSHIRE REGIMENT
NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS IN SHREWSBURY FOREST 31st JULY 1917

29th JULY 1917
Battalion Headquarters, “C”, “D” and “B” Companies went up to the forward area on the afternoon and evening of the 29th July 1917 (“A” Company was ordered to remain in camp on account of the trenches it was to occupy being flooded).
“C” Company relieved part of the 9th ROYAL SUSSEX REGT in 5 front line posts and the trenches about IMAGE TRENCH.
“D” Company took CANADA STREET TUNNELS.
“B” Company in LARCH WOOD TUNNELS.
“B” COMPANY suffered 5 other rank casualties through enemy gas shells on the march to the forward area and Lt. CAWSTON was wounded. Other Companies had no casualties.
Owing to the heavy rain and many shell holes the ground was in very bad condition.
Battalion Headquarters were established in CANADA STREET TUNNELS which were very wet and crowded with troops making progress through the tunnels very slow.
30th JULY 1917
Situation normal throughout the day except that enemy heavily shelled IMAGE SUPPORT, ILLUSIVE SUPPORT and CENTRAL AVENUE at 1.46am and 4.00pm. Enemy split red lights preceded the former shelling.
“A” Company marched from camp and occupied METROPOLITAN Left at 4.00pm, where they rested until night time and had tea.
A conference of Company Commanders was held at Battalion Headquarters at 5.00pm and notification that ZERO hour for the attack on the following morning was to be 3.50am was received before the conclusion of the conference – also correct time for synchronisation.
About 9.30pm Lt. Colonel MOBBS, D.S.O. (Commanding) went forward with Lt. Colonel MURPHY, D.S.O., M.C. (Officer Commanding 2nd LEINSTER REGT) and 2nd Lt. F. R. BERRIDGE, M.C. (Intelligence Officer 73rd Infantry Brigade) to ascertain the position of the stakes which had previously been put out by the 9th ROYAL SUSSEX REGT to mark the outer flanks of the assaulting Companies of the two Battalions in their forming up positions. These were found by moonlight, and 2nd Lt. BERRIDGE remained out to put out tape to mark the line upon which the Companies would form up.
During this time Battalion Headquarters were moved to another part of CANADA STREET TUNNELS. “A” and “C” Companies with “D” Company in support were formed up behind the tape line by 3.30am. This operation was begun at midnight as it was necessary to allow plenty of time for the Companies to find their positions without noise, and also for “D” Company to get out of CANADA STREET TUNNELS. Previous to ZERO (3.50am) the Germans were shelling moderately in “NO MANS LAND” causing some casualties amongst our troops who were forming up for the attack. A German barrage fell 50 to 100 yards in front of our forming up line less than three minutes after ZERO causing rather heavy casualties, including that of two officers. At the same time enemy shells fell 100 to 150 yards behind our own front line, but this could not be described as a barrage. The rapidity with which the enemy barrage opened would appear to show that he was expecting the attack.
Owing to the darkness the assaulting Companies were unable to keep a correct line, and also the men were inclined to “bunch” which it was difficult to prevent until daylight.
However owing to the same cause, ie: the darkness direction was undoubtedly lost from the beginning of the advance.
It appears that German machine guns were brought forward from JEER TRENCH into shell holes in front of it before our barrage reached them. They were thus quite (sic) while our barrage was piling up on JEER TRENCH.
Our assaulting troops being held up were unable to keep up with the barrage, lost direction, and became disorganised. The machine guns already referred to were dealt with enabling a further advance to be made across JEER TRENCH, but again German machine guns enfiladed us from LOWER STAR POST, which was then on our left flank and to our rear, which the enemy still continued to hold. The line reached is shown on the attached map
The assaulting Companies at this time were highly disorganised – had no connection with their left – and had no officers. It was then that the Commanding Officer Lt. Col. E. R. MOBBS, D.S.O., and 2nd Lt. BERRIDGE, M.C. arrived in the front line. The former with a handful of men charged the enemy machine gun post, and was seriously wounded. Before dying he wrote out a message to his Battalion Headquarters for reinforcements to be sent forward, and stating that he was seriously wounded – an act showing his devotion to duty at the last. The message however was never delivered.
It must be stated here that the capture of the first objective of blue line had been reported. This was correct as far as the Battalion front was concerned – but LOWER STAR POST, on our left, had not been captured. It had however been reported by walking wounded that the second objective, (or the black line) had been captured. It was then that Col. MOBBS decided to go forward to ascertain the situation.
Lt. Col. MOBBS’ daring and extraordinary courage being known he was restrained from leaving his Headquarters for half an hour, but at the end of that time he definitely decided to go forward with a view to personally supervising the consolidation of the ground captured and of selecting a position for advance Battalion Headquarters.
Before doing so he ordered “B” Company (in reserve) to advance, occupy and consolidate JEER TRENCH.
In a most critical situation when the two assaulting Companies had lost all their officers, 2nd Lt. F. R. BERRIDGE, M.C. with the assistance of Company Sergeant Major AFFORD and Sergeant TWENTYMAN reorganised the line and sent in a report to Battalion Headquarters. Upon receipt of this report “D” Company of the 13th MIDDLESEX REGT was sent forward to JEER TRENCH with special instructions to gain connection on the flanks. This Company suffered heavy casualties in going forward and is reported to have crossed JEER TRENCH and later to have withdrawn and “dug in” between ILLUSIVE DRIVE and ILLUSIVE RESERVE believing that none of our troops were in front of them.
The Trench Mortar Subsection also withdrew to that line from J.25.c.55.25. a German Trench Mortar position they had occupied believing it to be the one shown in aeroplane photographs about J.25.d.00.68., but owing to LOWER STAR POST being still held by the enemy it was decided to withdraw our advance troops to about the line of ILLUSIVE AVENUE and to consolidate strong posts on that line, and establish communication with a NORTHAMPTON strong point at J.31.a.5.7. and a LEINSTER strong point at J.25.a.4.4.
An amended order was sent to Officer Commanding “D” Company, 13th MIDDLESEX REGT.
2nd Lt. BERRIDGE again went forward to effect this withdrawal which he successfully accomplished, showing the utmost gallantry and dash, establishing a line of strong posts under heavy machine gun and shell fire. Several messages he sent back during the time he was forward did not reach Battalion Headquarters the runners having lost their way. He reported personally afterwards. 2nd Lt. BERRIDGE’s work cannot be overstated, and it was due to his efforts and devotion to duty that the situation was cleared. A carrying party was organised to take wire, sandbags, water and ammunition to the posts which had been established but it took many hours to find the way.
Stretcher bearers had suffered heavy casualties so that 12 reserve stretcher bearers were sent for from the back area, and in the meantime, on account of the large numbers of wounded who were lying out, stragglers (men who had lost their way etc) were collected and placed at the disposal of the Medical Officer. Many of these men did most excellent work, and the greater portion of the area was cleared by nightfall.
The relief of the Battalion, partly by the 1st NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT and partly by the 15th MIDDLESEX REGT was ordered on ZERO evening. Runners were sent forward to bring in guides from the posts. This was just before dark. The runners failed to find the posts and the guides never arrived. It being considered inadvisable to carry out the relief by night it was not commenced until about 4.00am the following day 1st August 1917.
Great credit is due to 2nd Lt.s GORRINGE, WILLIAMS and WILD, and the N.C.O.s and men with them in holding these posts during the night under heavy shell fire, and in the most trying circumstances.
During the morning of the 1st August 1917, the 1st NORTH STAFFORDSHIRE REGT relieved the three right posts of the Battalion and the 13th MIDDLESEX REGT relieved five posts on the left.
The former had been formed on the 72nd Brigade front when direction had been lost. The relief was completed by 11.45am.
A dump of barrage rations, water and rum was formed at CANADA STREET TUNNELS for the men on their way back to camp. It had rained incessantly throughout the operations and the men were thoroughly exhausted, wet through and covered in mud.
………………………
LOWER STAR POST
LOWER STAR POST proved to be the key of the situation, and undoubtedly was the cause of holding up the attack, and preventing the final objective being taken.
It is considered that the boundary between the two Units should not have passed so close to such a strong point but that special assaulting troops should have been detailed to envelope the post.
ZERO
If ZERO HOUR is during darkness it is extremely difficult for assaulting troops to keep proper direction and a correctly extended line. To ensure a successful operation from the start it would seem advisable that ZERO HOUR should be during daylight.
REPORTS
A line of objective should not be reported as captured until it is ascertained that the flanks have been secured and communication obtained on the right and left. It is dangerous to base reports on the statements of wounded.
STATE OF GROUND
Operations were undoubtedly handicapped by the bad condition of the ground owing to the severe weather which existed previous to and on the 31st July 1917. This also to a certain extent withheld the assaulting troops from keeping close in to our barrage, the rate of advance of which is considered to have been too fast under the circumstances.
MAP READING
The question of map reading generally, knowing one’s key position and finding the way especially at night proved exceedingly difficult. This was principally due to the similarity of the ground and lack of landmarks. The use of a compass with a large scale clearly contoured map would appear to have been the only safe method to adopt. It is not considered that the large SHREWSBURY FOREST map was adaptable to the circumstances.
SANITATION
Latrine accommodation in CANADA STREET TUNNELS was practically nil. No special latrine could be claimed and looked after by any one Battalion, because troops in the TUNNELS belonged to several Regiments. It would have been advantageous if a Brigade Sanitary Section had been organised to make and look after latrines. This would have probably decreased to large amount of urinating in the TUNNELS.
……………………………………
6/8/17 Captain
7th Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment.

APPENDIX “B”
SPECIAL ORDER
I would like to place on record my very high appreciation of the splendid fighting qualities and gallantry of Officers, N.C.O.’s and men who took part in the action of the 31st July 1917.
The enemy did his best to break up our attack and prevent us from gaining our objective. He employed his best troops for this purpose. His Artillery and machine gun fire was heavy and intense during the advance – the ground was boggy and ploughed up with shells. In spite of all these difficulties and opposition the 7th Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment and the 2nd Battalion Leinster Regiment drove the enemy from his position on the high ground which the Brigade had been ordered to seize. Many Officers were either killed or wounded and the fight resolved itself into a soldiers’ battle which was won by extraordinary pluck and determination. This was a performance of which troops may very well feel more than proud.
6/8/17 Brigadier General
Commanding 73rd Infantry Brigade.